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1 
COPYING AND CONTEXT: TYING AS A 
SOLUTION TO THE LACK OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 
OF CONTRACT TERMS 
LISA BERNSTEIN* 
In his Article Contracts as Technology Kevin Davis makes an 
analogy between technological innovation and contractual innovation 
and suggests that contractual innovation, like technological innova-
tion, can both add value to exchange and promote trade. Davis pre-
sents a theory of the uses and sources of contractual innovation that 
has at its core the idea that “[t]he principal determinant of the value 
of adopting a contract is the value of the changes in behavior it in-
duces.”1 The Article then draws on this theory and the analogy to 
technological innovation to explore the incentives of law firms, busi-
nesspeople, trade associations, and a variety of nonprofit institutions 
to engage in contractual innovation, even though there is no equiva-
lent of copyright, trademark, or patent protection for contractual lan-
guage. It concludes that given the lack of intellectual property 
protection for contractual language, potential contractual innovators 
of all types are likely to make socially sub-optimal investments in con-
tractual innovation. 
This Comment adds to Davis’s analysis by describing the ways 
that standard-form contracts and trading rules are produced and used 
in trade associations. It suggests that many trade associations tie these 
contracts to other products and services they offer in ways that create 
contractual value for their members that is not fully available to those 
who might simply decide to adopt, or more aptly, copy the language 
of their contractual forms. As a result, association members endorse 
contract and trade rules revision efforts funded by membership dues 
even though these contracts can be copied and these rules incorpo-
rated by reference into transactions between nonmembers who in ef-
fect free ride on the associations’ costly drafting efforts. More 
broadly, exploring contractual innovation in the trade association 
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context suggests that once it is recognized that the value of a contract 
depends as much on the institutional and interpersonal context in 
which it is adopted, governed, performed, and enforced as it does on 
the specific words used, the lack of intellectual property protection 
for contractual language might be far less of a barrier to contractual 
innovation generally than Davis suggests. 
Trade associations are, and traditionally have been, important 
sources of standard-form contracts—in the form of both traditional 
contracts and trading rules that can be incorporated into contracts by 
reference. At least as far back as the 1860s, many United States–
based associations have provided standard-form contracts and sets of 
detailed trading rules to help promote and support the exchange of 
particular types of goods.2 These contracts and rules were regularly 
revised in response to problems that arose, changes in technology, 
and other changes in market conditions. The process of adopting 
these changes was—and in the case of trading rules, continues to be—
costly and time-consuming. Trade rules are revised by committees of 
both paid association executives and elected members of the group’s 
governing board. Changes are researched and debated extensively. In 
most groups, rule changes must be approved by a majority of group 
members, making it important for the revisers to clearly articulate the 
reasons for the proposed change. Although changes in optional 
standard-form contracts do not typically require membership ap-
proval, in practice associations go to great lengths to adopt only those 
changes that will be widely accepted in the trade. 
Some of the associations that create these rules and contracts 
make them freely available on the web (or, in earlier times, in public 
libraries). Others make an effort to keep them private (or, at a mini-
mum, discourage their dissemination) by posting them in members-
only parts of their website. In practice, however, most association-
drafted contracts and rules become widely known and are commonly 
used and/or referenced by nonmember traders. Nevertheless, despite 
this widespread copying of contracts and free riding on the invest-
ment of their members, these groups continue to invest in revising 
these rules and contracts. The reason for this is simple: Although the 
language of these rules and contracts can easily be copied by non-
members, the value created by consummating a transaction using 
these forms is much higher when the forms are used in transactions 
between association members than it is when they are used in 
 
 2  For a description of the rules creation process in several industries that occurred 
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transactions between nonmembers. Put more generally, while non-
members can contract using the same legally enforceable set of writ-
ten terms as members by using the standard form contracts or 
referencing the group’s trading rules, these agreements cannot repli-
cate the member-specific adjudication, education, and enforcement 
mechanisms built into these agreements; the common understanding 
of rules and contracts fostered by the association’s educational ef-
forts; the flexible adjustments the association’s adjudicative approach 
promotes; or the value created by the legally unenforceable set of im-
plicit terms in these agreements that are cooperatively created and 
bonded in the shadow of the association’s membership rules and in-
formation intermediary functions. 
Adjudication: The associations that make these rules and con-
tracts typically provide an arbitration system to resolve disputes aris-
ing under them. As a condition of membership, members must agree 
to submit all disputes with other members to the association’s private 
legal system in lieu of going to court. These private legal systems are 
relatively inexpensive to access.3 They permit but do not require par-
ties to be represented by legal counsel, permit only limited discovery, 
and tend to render quick and predictable judgments. Together these 
factors make a threat to resort to third-party dispute resolution credi-
ble over a greater range of contracting values than it would be if an 
identical contract that could only be enforced in court were used, 
thereby increasing transactors’ incentives to perform as promised. 
The arbitrators who decide cases in these systems are drawn 
from the association membership and tend to be prominent industry 
members. They are familiar with the way business is done throughout 
the trade and are well versed in the meaning of trade rules and stand-
ard contract provisions. Nevertheless, the arbitrators in these tribu-
nals typically employ a formalistic/textualist adjudicative approach. 
They do not look to courses of performance, courses of dealing, us-
ages of trade, good faith, or the particulars of the contracting context 
to interpret agreements.4 Arguments based on fairness, equity, or 
unique aspects of the contracting context are therefore generally una-
vailing. As a consequence, the adjudicative process in these private 
 
 3  For examples of filing fees from many associations, see Lisa Bernstein, The 
NGFA Arbitration System at Work, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., 5 & n.11 (Mar. 15, 2007), 
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/linkstorage/ngfa.pdf.  
 4  See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter 
Bernstein, Merchant Law]; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton 
Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 U. MICH. L. 
REV. 1724, 1735–37 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Cotton Industry]. 
BERNSTEIN-FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2013 5:16 PM 
4 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 88:1 
 
systems is cheaper, faster, and more predictable than it is in the public 
court system. A contract between two association members that is 
subject to industry arbitration is therefore more valuable than an 
identical contract used by two nonmembers who have to bear the cost 
and unpredictability associated with going to court when a dispute re-
quiring third-party adjudication arises. 
Education: The associations that promulgate these rules and con-
tracts also invest resources in educating members about the terms and 
meanings of these documents. This, too, operates as a tying mecha-
nism. Seminars are held where traders study the rules, work hypo-
theticals, and take exams. One group even runs a summer school 
where new traders are taught the industry’s rules and norms.5 
Associations also host web seminars, listservs, and other web-based 
programs to familiarize traders with both industry norms and the con-
tent and meaning of trade rules and standardized contracts. Trade 
publications contain discussions of the way rules work and often ad-
vise transactors to include particular provisions to achieve certain de-
fined goals. Thus, when two traders who have received this education 
are doing business under association-drafted contracts or trade rules, 
they are likely to have a common understanding of what they are re-
quired to do, as well as an understanding of the ways that the 
industry-expert arbitrators are likely to decide a particular case. As a 
result of these relatively convergent expectations about both the con-
tours of the expected performance and the outcome of potential dis-
putes, member-to-member use of a standard-form contract should 
lead to both reduced disputing rates and increased settlement rates, 
as compared to situations where two nonmembers contract using the 
same form-contract. This common knowledge (combined with the 
membership rules and enforcement mechanisms discussed below) 
promotes the formation of cooperative contractual relationships be-
tween members and helps to ensure that, once established, these rela-
tionships endure, thereby adding value to these exchanges.6 
Enforcement: The associations that create private legal systems 
also screen new members for commercial integrity, often requiring an 
existing member to guarantee their contractual obligations for a pe-
riod of time. Arbitration opinions tend to be circulated widely and of-
ten contain descriptions of bad contracting behavior, even on the part 
 
 5  See Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra note 4, at 1727 n.16. 
 6  For a detailed discussion of the ways that a trade association’s membership rules, 
private legal system attributes, social outreach, and information-intermediary functions 
can promote the creation and maintenance of cooperative contracting relationships, see 
generally Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra note 4. 
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of parties who prevail under the rules. As a consequence, when mem-
bers use these contracts with other members they are, in effect, also 
posting a reputation bond that gives these agreements more value 
than if the same written contracts were used with a nonmember. 
When an arbitration decision is rendered in these private systems, the 
losing party is very likely to comply with the judgment, as most 
groups both publicize non-compliance and expel non-complying 
members from the group, an act that tends to be widely publicized 
throughout the trade.7 Although arbitral judgments can be attacked in 
court (albeit on the very narrow grounds permitted by the Federal 
Arbitration Act), in practice this is very rarely done. Disputants un-
derstand that going to court is a violation of industry norms of be-
havior and will become quickly known, damaging their reputation 
and making others less likely to deal with them. As a consequence, 
most arbitral judgments are complied with promptly. This, in turn, in-
creases the value of these contracts when used between members as 
compared to the value they would have when used between non-
members. 
Extralegal Terms: As discussed above, association-created tribu-
nals do not, for the most part, look to course of performance, course 
of dealing, usage of trade, or other context-based considerations in 
deciding cases. As a consequence, transactors can supplement the 
association-drafted standard-form contracts with value-creating 
extralegal terms (terms that can condition on information that is 
observable but not verifiable) backed only by reputation bonds 
and/or the threat of terminating a profitable repeat dealing 
transactional relationship. Because member-transactors are confident 
that association arbitrators, unlike courts, will not transform the 
extralegal terms of their agreements into legally enforceable contract 
provisions, members dealing with other members are able to enter 
into agreements that consist of the optimal mix of both these standard 
provisions and transaction-specific value-creating legally 
unenforceable terms that are backed only by nonlegal sanctions. 
These legally unenforceable provisions can add significant value to 
contractual relationships that cannot be replicated in transactions 
between nonmembers. Nonmembers typically lack access to the 
 
 7  Many associations publicize expulsions in the trade press or member circulars, while 
others, like the diamond industry, go much further. When a diamond trader fails to 
promptly comply with an arbitration award, he is expelled from every diamond bourse in 
the world and a large picture of him, akin to a Wild West wanted poster, is posted at the 
entry to every bourse along with a warning not to do business with him. See Lisa 
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 128, 156 (1992).  
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association-facilitated reputation and information networks that 
create the nonlegal sanctions that are needed to reliably bond these 
provisions, provisions that often condition on information that is 
observable but not verifiable. As a consequence, transactions 
between members that are governed by combinations of legal and 
extralegal terms will be systematically more valuable than 
transactions between nonmembers using the same standard-form 
contracts that must be enforced, if at all, in the public legal system. 
Finally, because association tribunals do not look to courses of 
performance or courses of dealing, association members dealing with 
other members will be more likely to make flexible value-creating 
adjustments when the need for them arises; they will be able to do so 
safe in the knowledge that these adjustments will not erode their con-
tractual rights in the future should a dispute requiring third-party ad-
judication arise.8 
In sum, by tying members’ use of their standard-form contracts 
and trading rules to a variety of association-provided benefits that are 
not available to nonmembers, associations ensure that the value cre-
ated by their rules and contracts when used in transactions between 
members will always be higher than the value of their rules and con-
tracts when used in transactions between nonmembers. Therefore, 
even when these rules and contracts are copied by nonmembers who 
free-ride on both the efforts of members and the association dues that 
are allocated to revise these rules and contracts, the value captured by 
members appears to be large enough to encourage contractual inno-
vation, though whether or not it is at the fully optimal amount cannot 
be determined. The trade association case therefore illustrates a more 
general reason that contract drafting and innovation occurs despite 
the lack of intellectual property protection—namely, that the 
individuals, firms, and groups that fund such innovation often operate 
in social, institutional, and transactional contexts that give their inno-
vations a higher value to them than others can appropriate, making 
continued investment in contractual innovation desirable despite 
their limited ability to prevent others from appropriating and using 
their linguistic innovations. 
 
 
 8  For examples of this type of value creation at work in the grain and feed context, 
see Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 4. 
